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Goldstein: Hazard Communication in the Workplace

HAZARD COMMUNICATION IN THE
WORKPLACE
Mark L. Goldstein*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recognizing the dangers presented to employees by hazardous
substances in the workplace, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (hereinafter "OSHA") in 1983 promulgated a Hazard Communication Standard (hereinafter "HCS").1 The HCS's
stated purpose is to ensure that the hazards of all chemicals produced or imported by chemical manufacturers or importers will be
evaluated and transmitted to employers and employees. 2 The rationale of the HCS is that an employee who is properly informed and
trained will be better able to handle hazardous substances safely
than one who is not.
Prior to 1983, numerous states, including New York, had enacted "Right to Know" legislation, requiring manufacturers and
other employers to provide hazardous substance information to employees.4 The HCS purported to preempt these state "Right to
* B.S. from Cornell University in 1972; M.B.A. from Cornell Graduate School of Business in 1975; J.D. from Cornell Law School in 1976; Partner in the law firm Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent & Lehrer, New York, New York. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Eric Siegel, an associate of the firm.
1. 48 Fed. Reg. 53279 (1983) (codified at OSHA, Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1200 (1984)). The original rule was filed at the Federal Register in 1983, 48 Fed. Reg.
53279 (1983), but petitions for judicial review of the rule were filed in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit on November 22 of that year. United Steelworkers v.
Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985). Hence, the rule was not codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations until after the Third Circuit's decision on May 24, 1985. OSHA, Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1986).
2. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.59(1) (1988).
3. 48 Fed. Reg. 53280, 53281 (1983) (codified at OSHA, Hazard Communication, 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1984) (containing the original enactment).
4. See O'Reilly, Risks of Assumptions: Impacts of Regulatory Label Warnings Upon
IndustrialProducts Liability, 37 CATH.U. L. REV. 85, 106 n.137 (1987) (stating that Right to
Know laws exist in about 32 states apart from federal requirements (citing Final Rule, 52 Fed.
Reg. 31,852, 31,857 (1987)); O'Reilly, Driving a Soft Bargain: Unions, Toxic Materials,and
Right to Know Legislation, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv.307, 309 n.13 (1985) (listing twenty state
statutes, adopted as of 1985, which establish right to know legislation); see also Lyndon, Infor-
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Know" statutes.' The end result of much litigation6 was a court-ordered revision of the HCS to include all employers, and not just
manufacturing employers, who have employees exposed to hazardous

chemicals in their workplace.7
mation Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87
MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1825 n.1 13 (1988) stating that:
The first state Right to Know laws were enacted in New York and California. See
N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW §§ 4800-4808 (McKinney 1985); N.Y. LABOR LAW
§§ 875-883 (McKinney 1985); CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 6360-6399 (West Supp.
1988). California has supplemented its original [R]ight to [K]now statute with the
more expansive Proposition 65. Cal. Admin. Notice Reg. 87, No. II-Z (Mar. 13,
1987) (codified at CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25180.7, 25249.5-.13 (West
Supp. 1988)). The proliferation of other state regulations is well reported. See generally, BNA SPECIAL REPORT, RIGHT-TO-KNOW: A REGULATORY UPDATE ON
PROVIDING CHEMICAL HAZARD INFORMATION (1985) (twenty-five states had enacted worker right-to-know provisions as of 1985).
For an in-depth analysis of Proposition 65, see Christenson, Interpreting the Purposes of
Initiatives: Proposition 65, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (1989); DeFranco, California'sToxics Initiative: Making It Work, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1195 (1988).
5. OSHA, Hazard Communications, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(2) (1984) stating that:
"[tihis occupational safety and health standard is intended to address comprehensively the
issue of evaluating the potential hazards of chemicals, and communicating information concerning hazards and appropriate protective measures to employees, and to preempt any legal
requirements of a state . . . pertaining to the subject." Any state which desires to assume
responsibility in this area may only do so under the provisions of § 18 of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (29 U.S.C. 651 et. seq.) which deals with state jurisdiction and state
plans. See generally Employee Right to Know: Should the Federal Government or the States
Regulate the Dissemination of Hazardous Substance Information to Protect Employee
Health & Safety? 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 633, 652 (1985) [hereinafter Employee Right to
Know] (discussing the preemptive effect of the OSHA Right to Know Rule); infra text accompanying notes 249-303.
6. See New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir.
1985), affid, 868 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3246 (1989). In Hughey the
plaintiffs, New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce and Fragrance Materials Association
claimed that the broad container labeling provisions of New Jersey's Right to Know Act were
preempted by OSHA. Id. The defendants were various New Jersey officials charged with implementing the Right to Know Act. Id. The court held that OSHA did not implicitly preempt
the provisions of New Jersey's Right to Know Act, finding that they could coexist without
obstructing each other. See id. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir.
1985); infra text and accompanying notes 209-25 (discussing the Auchter case).
7. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Pendergrass, 819 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1987). In Pendergrass the United Steelworkers of America petitioned the court to enforce the judgment
granted in United Steelworkers of America v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985). 819 F.2d
at 1264. In Auchter, the court held that "the Hazard Communication Standard . . . [was]
valid and may be applied to the manufacturing sector, . . . [and] directed the Secretary 'to
reconsider its application to employees in other sectors, and to order its application in those
sectors unless he can state reasons why such application would not be feasible.'" Pendergrass,
819 F.2d at 1264 (citing Auchter, 763 F.2d at 743). The petitioners contended that the Secretary had not complied with the judgment in Auchter. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Pendergrassagreed that the Secretary had not acted in compliance with the court's
judgment in Auchter. Id. The court thereby ordered revision of the HCS within sixty days to
make the Hazard Communication Standard applicable to all workers covered by OSHA. Id.
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Subsequent rulemaking procedures and litigation have produced

a performance-oriented standard8 that covers thousands of chemical
substances used in numerous industries.9 While this revision of the

HCS engendered a great deal of controversy and litigation throughout the past few years, the revised HCS is now fully in effect in all

industries. 10 Other modifications of the HCS proposed by the Office
of Management and the Budget have been rejected by the Supreme
Court in Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, in which the
Court considered OMB's authority to order changes in the HCS. 1
The revised HCS purports to preempt all state and local laws on

evaluating and communicating hazard information to employees.'

2

Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 31852 (1987).
8. For a discussion of the wide discretion given manufacturers in performing hazard
evaluations and in disclosing product ingredients under the HCS and of the HCS's effectiveness, see Carle, A Hazardous Mix: Discretion to Disclose and Incentives to Suppress Under
OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard,97 YALE L.J. 581 (1988).
9. Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 31852 (1987) (containing rules and regulations to expand
the scope of HCS, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1986), to cover all employees under OSHA). For a
discussion of the need for better dissemination of information about the numerous chemicals
now available in the home and workplace and the failures of both the market and state and
federal laws in making this information more accessible, see Lyndon, supra note 5.
10. See Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Brock, 862 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied sub nom. Associated General Contractors of Am. v. OSHA, 109 S. Ct. 2062
(1989). National Grain & Feed Ass'n Inc. v. OSHA, 109 S. Ct. 2063 (1989). In Brock the
Third Circuit reaffirmed its decisions in United Steelworkers of America v. Pendergrass, 855
F.2d 108 (3d Cit. 1988); United Steelworkers of America v. Pendergrass, 819 F.2d 1263 (3d
Cit. 1987); and United Steelworkers of America v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985),
denying the procedural and substantive challenges to the HCS by petitioners in an effort to
prevent enforcement of the HCS. Id.
11. 110 S. Ct. 929 (1990). The Department of Labor in compliance with the Third
Circuit's Court of Appeals ruling in United Steelworkers of America v. Pendergrassissued a
revised Hazard Communication Standard. Id. (citing to 52 Fed. Reg. 31852 (1987)). The
Department of Labor submitted the revised standard to the OMB for review. Id. The OMB
rejected three provisions contained within the revised standard. See id.; see also 52 Fed. Reg.
46076 (1987) (containing the OMB's rejection). The OMB offered several modifications. Id.
However, these were rejected by the Supreme Court in Dole. 110 S. Ct. at 929 (rejecting
statements by the OMB contained in 52 Fed. Reg. 46076 (1987)); see also infra notes 27-33
and accompanying text (discussing the provisions rejected by the OMB).
12. OSHA, Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(2) (1986) (stating that
the standard is "intended to address comprehensively the issue of evaluating and communicating chemical hazards to employees in the manufacturing sector, and to prompt any state law
pertaining to this subject."). To date, there has been much debate over the preemption issue.
See, e.g., Carle, supra note 8, at 584 n.14 (discussing state provisions which contain more
stringent hazard disclosure requirements than the HCS, but which were still preempted by the
HCS); Feitshans, HazardSubstances in the Workplace: How Much Does the Employee Have
the "Right to Know"? 1985 DET. C.L. REv. 697 (1985); Note, The Extent of OSHA Preemption of State Hazard Reporting Requirements, 88 COLUmI. L. REv. 630 (1988) (authored by J.
Manna Jr.) [hereinafter OSHA Preemption]; Schroeder & Shapiro, Responses to Occupational Disease: The Role of Markets, Regulation and Information, 72 GEo. L.J. 1231, 128891 (1984) (arguing that HCS need not preempt state statutes offering workers greater protec-
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Indeed, state Right to Know statutes have been held preempted by
the HCS insofar as they pertain to the protection of employee health
and safety in the private sector."3
This Article will examine the changes made in the HCS and
their impact on New York's Right to Know statute. Specifically,
Part II will explore the HCS's provision and the revisions made as a
result of the litigation challenging the HCS. 14 Part III will discuss
parallel provisions of New York's Right to Know law, and the provisions of the two laws will be compared to ascertain the legal duties
of New York employers in providing hazardous substance information to their employees. 5 Lastly, Part IV will briefly set forth the
principles underlying the Federal Preemption Doctrine and will analyze how the HCS's preemption of substantial portions of the New
York Right to Know law will impact upon employers doing business
in the state. 6
II.

THE FEDERAL

HCS

A. Background
Finding that "personal injuries and illnesses arising out of work
situations imposed a substantial burden on interstate commerce,"
Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act (hereinafter "OSH Act") in 1970.17 The purpose of the OSH Act is to "assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation
safe and healthful working conditions ... .
Pursuant to Section 655 of the OSH Act, on November 25,
1983, the Secretary of Labor promulgated the HCS to implement
the OSH Act's purposes.' 9 The HCS was modified in several respects as a result of challenges before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.2 First, the trade secret protection aftion); Tyson, The Preemptive Effect of the OSHA Hazard Communication Standardon State
and Community Right to Know Laws, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1010 (1987); Note, Toward a
Meaningful "Right-to-Know'" Model Legislation and Commentary, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS, J.
621 (1986) (authored by Nancy S.Kupfer) (discussing the preemption issue and proposing
model state Right to Know legislation).
13. See, e.g., Hughey, 774 F.2d 587 (holding that New Jersey's state Right to Know
statute was preempted by HCS in the manufacturing sector of the economy only); 88 A.L.R.
Fed. 833, 841-45 (1988) (containing an in-depth discussion of tests for preemption).
14. See infra text and accompanying notes 17-193.
15. See infra text and accompanying notes 194-240.
16. See infra text and accompanying notes 241-311.
17. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-678 (West 1985).
18. 29 U.S.C.A. § 651(b) (West 1985).
19. 48 Fed. Reg. 53279 (1983) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1984)).
20. See Pendergrass, 855 F.2d at 108; Pendergrass,819 F.2d at 1263; Auchter, 763
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forded to information readily discoverable through reverse engineer-

ing was eliminated.21 Second, a rule was adopted permitting access
by employees and their representatives to trade secret chemical identities.22 Third, the HCS was expanded to cover all employers, not

just employers in the, manufacturing sector.2 3 The revised HCS became effective for chemical manufacturers, importers and distribu-

tors on September 23, 1987.24 It was scheduled to take effect in the
non-manufacturing sector on May 23, 1988;25 however, certain

agency and court actions delayed the effective date of the revised
HCS.26
In September 1987, OSHA submitted the revised standard to
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of
Management and Budget (hereinafter "OMB"). 27 In October 1987,
OMB, acting under the Paperwork Reduction Act (hereinafter
"PRA"), 2" disapproved the revised HCS, conditioning the May 23
effective date of the revised rule on the deletion or modification of
the three provisions of the rule which it found objectionable. 9 First,
OMB disfavored the provision adopted in the revised HCS which
requires that Material Data Safety Sheets ("hereinafter MSDS") 3 °
F.2d at 728. Petitions for judicial review of the original HCS, filed at the Federal Register in
1983, were filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on November 22,
1983, by the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, and by Public Citizen, Inc.,
representing itself and a number of larger groups. See 53 Fed. Reg. 24822 (1988) (discussing
the history of these cases). Motions to intervene were filed by the Chemical Manufacturers
Association, the American Petroleum Institute, the National Paint and Coatings Association,
the States of New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey. See id. In addition, petitions for review
of the HCS were filed in the First Circuit by the State of Massachusetts, in the Second Circuit
by the State of New York, in the Seventh Circuit by the State of Illinois, in the Fourth Circuit
by the Flavor and Extract Manufacturers' Association, and in the District of Columbia Circuit
by the Fragrance Materials Association. Auchter, 763 F.2d at 728. With the exception of the
last two cases mentioned, which were withdrawn, these cases were subsequently transferred to
the Third Circuit and consolidated into one proceeding. Id.
21. 51 Fed. Reg. 34590 (1987).
22. Id.
23. Auchter, 763 F.2d at 728 (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(b)(1) (1986)).
24. Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 31852 (1987).
25. See id.
26. See Pendergrass,819 F.2d at 1263 (ordering the Secretary of Labor to comply with
the judgment in Auchter, 763 F.2d at 728, thereby expanding the application of the HCS).
27. See Dole, 110 S.Ct. at 929 (citing 52 Fed, Reg. 31852 (1987) (containing the
revised standard)).
28. 44 U.S.C.A. §§ 3501-3502 (West Supp. 1989).
29. Technical Amendments, 52 Fed. Reg. 46075-77 (1987); see Philip, The Paperwork
Reduction Act in United Steelworkers of America v. Pendergrass:Undue Restriction and Unrealized Potential, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 920 (1989) (maintaining that the goals of the
Paperwork Reduction Act and the HCS can be reconciled).
30. 52 Fed. Reg. at 46077. "Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS)" means "written or
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be provided on multi-employer worksites, such as construction
sites. 31 Second, OMB disapproved an exemption from the labeling
requirements of the HCS for consumer products used in the same
manner and quantities as intended for consumer use. 32 Lastly, it disapproved an exemption from the labeling of drugs in tablet or pill
form regulated by the Federal Drug Administration. 33
After a series of negotiations, OMB allowed the revised standard to be implemented on May 23, 1988, as scheduled, but without
the "disapproved" portions. 4 In response to OMB criticism, in early
August 1988, OSHA published a proposal, reopening the rulemaking
procedure with regard to the revised HCS.3 5
During this period, OMB's disapproval of the revised HCS was
challenged by several states, labor organizations, and public interest
groups in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.3 6 In August 1988, after a series of rulings by different panels of
the Third Circuit, the Court of Appeals finally invalidated OMB's
disapproval of the statute, ruling that OMB had exceeded
its statua7
HCS.
the
of
portions
disapproving
in
tory authority
While OMB initiated its review of the HCS, the construction
industry brought two separate suits in October of 1987 challenging
OSHA's expansion of the HCS. 38 Those suits were subsequently conprinted material concerning a hazardous chemical which is prepared in accordance with paragraph (g) of this section [29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c) (1986)]." Id. The section sets forth the
contents and requirements of the MSDS. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g)(1986). Id. at 46077-78.
31. 52 Fed. Reg. at 46077 (discussing what is now 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(e)(2)
(1988)).
32. 52 Fed. Reg. at 46078 (discussing what is now 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(b)(6)(vii)
(1988)).
33. 52 Fed. Reg. at 46078-79 (discussing what is now 29 C.F.R. at § 1910.1200(b)(6)
(viii) (1988)).
34. OSHA, Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.59 (1988).
35. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking [NPRM] and Notice of Public Hearing, 53 Fed.
Reg. 29822 (1988). Not only did OSHA invite comment for sixty days following publication of
this notice of proposed rulemaking, but it also scheduled a public hearing to provide an opportunity for additional input. Id.
36. See Pendergrass, 855 F.2d at 108.
37. Pendergrass,855 F.2d at 114. The Third Circuit reasoned that OSHA's promulgation on August 24, 1987 of the HCS making it applicable to all employees both inside and
outside the manufacturing sector was "a good faith compliance" with the orders set forth in
Auchter, 763 F.2d at 728 and Pendergrass 819 F.2d at 1263. Id. "The slight changes that
were made in the standard were a logical outgrowth of the rulemaking record which we previously reviewed. Withdrawal of the provisions disapproved by OMB was accordingly inconsistent with those orders." Id. (citation omitted).
38. See Construction Employers Challenge OSHA's Expanded Hazard Standard,Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 202, at A-10 (Oct. 21, 1987). In Associated Contractorsof Virginia v.
OSHA, the AGC, which is an association of construction contractors, filed a petition for review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Id. In Contractors of Virginia v.
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solidated into one action entitled Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. McLaughlin.39 The basis for the construction industry's
challenge to the revised HCS was its contention that work sites are
too transient and mobile to comply with the same requirements that
cover fixed workplaces.4"
The construction industry's case was transferred to the Third
Circuit, consolidated with other similar actions, and a temporary order staying the effectiveness of the HCS, issued in May 1988, was
enforced by an order of the Third Circuit on June 24, 1988.41 Then,
following its earlier decision in United Steelworkers v. Pendergrass,
in November 1988, the Third Circuit denied the petitions for review
and vacated the stay.42 In considering the consolidated challenges to
the sufficiency of OSHA's notice and rulemaking procedures, the
Secretary of Labor's significant risk determinations, and OSHA's alleged delegation of rulemaking authority to scientific groups to determine the substances covered by the HCS, the Third Circuit found
that, "none of the substantive or procedural challenges for the application of the hazard communications standard to the construction or
grain processing and storage industries have merit."43 Further requests from other petitioners and intervenors in the case for a continuation of the stay were denied by the Third Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brennan and later Chief Justice Rehnquist.44 In
May, ending the uncertainty concerning the extension of the HCS to
the non-manufacturing sector, the Supreme Court declined to review
OSHA, ABC, which represents shop construction companies, filed suit with the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id.
39. No. 87-1582 (D.C. Cir.) (WESTLAW, Allfeds library, CTADC file).
40. Construction Employers Challenge OSHA's Expanded Hazard Standard, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 202, at A-10 (Oct. 21, 1987) (quoting the Construction Advisory Committee on OSHA); see Hazard Communication Standard Generates Paperwork, Headaches
for Contractors, 10 INDIANAPOLIS Bus. J. 2B (May 22, 1989) (discussing the construction
industry's suit and exploring problems unique to the industry).

41.

For an unreported court discussion of the construction industry claims, see Final

Rule, Technical Amendments and Notice Regarding Enforcement, 54 Fed. Reg. 6886, 6887

(1989).
42. Associated Builders & Contractors v. Brock, 862 F.2d 63, 69 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied sub nom. Associated General Contractors of Am. v. OSHA, 109 S. Ct. 2062 (1989);
National Grain & Feed Ass'n. v. OSHA, 109 S. Ct. 2063 (1989).

43. Brock, 862 F.2d at 69.
44. Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. OSHA, No. 88-1070, 88-1075 (3d Cir.
Jan. 13, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file); Final Rule, Technical Amendments and

Notice Regarding Enforcement 6886, 6887-88 (1989). Application for stay to Chief Justice
Rehnquist denied, Associated General Contractors of Am. v. OSHA, 109 S. Ct. 1113 (1989);
Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. OSHA, 109 S. Ct. 1114 (1989). The Supreme
Court denied certiorari on February 26, 1990. See Court Declines Review in OSHA Case,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at A-8 (Feb. 27, 1990).
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the petitions of the National, Grain and Feed Association and the
Associated General Contractors, thus leaving the Third Circuit's decision intact."'
In February 1989, OSHA published a notice in the Federal
Register to "advise the public, that, as a result of further court actions, all provisions of the rule are now in effect in all segments of
the industry." 46 The notice also announced technical amendments to
the HCS that deleted all notations indicating OMB disapproval in
connection with the three provisions at issue in United Steelworkers
47
v. Pendergrass.
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the construction industry lawsuit makes the expansion of the HCS to non-manufacturing industries valid. Furthermore, the controversy between OMB and
OSHA, regarding OMB's disapproval of certain provisions of the revised HCS, has been resolved against OMB, further strengthening
the ability of OSHA to apply the HCS broadly.48 In its petition for
review in Dole, the government stated that the Third Circuit's holding would seriously disrupt OMB's efforts to reduce the paperwork
burdens facing employers and individuals. 49 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the Paperwork Reduction Act
does not authorize OMB "to review and countermand agency regulations mandating disclosure by regulated entities directly to third parties. '' 50 In holding that the paperwork law did not give OMB the
authority to scrutinize substantive OSHA regulations, the Court
noted that no provisions in the PRA expressly indicate whether Congress intended the Act to apply disclosure rules as well as inforniation-gathering rules. 51 The Court concluded that the language and
structure of PRA refer solely to the collection of information by, or
for use of, a federal agency; the Act could not "reasonably be interpreted to cover rules mandating disclosure of information to a third
party."52
45. Associated Builders & Contractors v. Brock, 862 F.2d 63, 69 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied sub nom. Associated General Contractors of Am. v. OSHA, 109 S. Ct. 2062 (1989);
National Grain & Feed Ass'n. v. OSHA, 109 S. Ct. 2063 (1989).
46. 54 Fed. Reg. 6886 (1989).

47.

855 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1988); see also supra notes, 29-33 and accompanying text.

48.

Dole v.- United Steelworkers of Am., I10 S. Ct. 929 (1989); see Philip, supra note

49.

Id.

29.

50. Id.
51. Id. at 929.
52. Id. The Supreme Court's decision is expected to have wide implications. "Under the
Supreme Court ruling, OMB will have a real hard time regulating labeling, disclosure require-

ments, hazard communications-any information requirements that the government directs
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B. Scope

1. Definitions.-The revised HCS13 requires chemical manufacturers or importers to evaluate the hazards of the chemicals they
pIroduce or import. 4 In turn, all employers must provide their employees with information concerning the hazardous chemicals to
'which they are exposed.5 5 The scope of the HCS is limited to any
chemical which is "known to be present in the workplace in such a
manner that employees may be exposed under normal conditions of
use or in a foreseeable emergency." 5 It seems logical that no testing
need be undertaken to comply with the HCS unless a hazardous
chemical is known to be present.
The term "chemical manufacturer" is defined by OSHA as an
"employer with a workplace where chemical(s) are produced for use
or distribution."'5 "Employer" is now defined as a "person engaged
in a business where chemicals are either used, or are produced for
use or distribution, including a contractor or subcontractor," reflecting the expansion of the HCS's coverage."8 Hazardous chemical information must be disseminated by employers to their employees
through a hazard communication program, labels, MSDS and
training.5 9
The HCS covers situations where employees "may be exposed"
to hazardous chemicals. 60 Thus, potential as well as actual exposure
is covered by the HCS. OSHA wanted to ensure that employees
one entity to tell another." Supreme Court Decision Undercuts OMB Authority to Review
Some Regulations, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at A-17, 18 (Feb. 22, 1990) (quoting
David Vladeck, an attorney for the Public Citizen Litigation Group). Further:

[T]he effects of the decision will be felt particularly at the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, whose hazard communications standard was the subject of
the case; at the Environmental Protection Agency, which often requires public disclosure as a regulatory technique; and at the Food and Drug Administration, which

frequently mandates labeling requirements for food, drugs and cosmetics. Nutrition
information labels, Yarnings on products from toys to electronic equipment, and
securities disclosurd requirements are probably affected by the ruling.

Id.
53. The HCS, revised on August 24, 1987, took effect for all manufacturing and nonmanufacturing employers, excluding the construction industry, on June 24, 1988, and is codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1926.59 (1988). The HCS for the construction industry, codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1926.59 (1988), has been in effect since June 24, 1988.

54. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(b)(1); see Carle, supra note 8 (discussing the discretion
given to
55.
56.
57.

manufacturing sector employers).
Id.
29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(b)(2).
29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(c).

58.

Id.

59.
60.

29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(b)(1)(1988).
29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(b)(2).
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would receive information about all chemical hazards in their workplaces so that they could be prepared to deal with emergencies, in
addition to routine exposures."'
Although the HCS covers potential exposures, not all employees
of the same employer are entitled to its protection. For example, in a
retail department store, maintenance workers may be covered because their job exposes them to hazardous chemicals, whereas an accountant in the billing department might not be likely to experience
such exposure and would, therefore, fall outside of the HCS's coverage. 2 Indeed, OSHA defined "employee" as a "worker who may be
exposed to hazardous chemicals under normal operating conditions
or in foreseeable emergencies. '"63 Workers who encounter hazardous
chemicals only in non-routine, isolated instances, such as office workers or bank tellers, are not covered. 4
This distinction between workers who encounter routine exposures and workers who encounter non-routine exposures to hazardous
substances may be a tenuous one. 65 First, people vary in their susceptibility and exposure history. To say that employee health and
safety is only threatened when one is "routinely" exposed to a given
hazardous substance assumes, perhaps incorrectly, that a single exposure to a hazardous chemical does not endanger the safety of the
employees.
Notwithstanding such limitations to the coverage of the HCS, it
does appear that its coverage is expansive enough to cover many employees who are exposed to hazardous substances on an appreciable
level. For example, employers and their employees who only handle
sealed containers of chemicals are covered, even if the containers
would not be opened under normal, routine use.66 Thus, employees in
warehousing, retail sales, marine cargo handling, and trucking terminals are covered by the HCS. 7 OSHA has assumed that all such
containers could possibly leak or break,68 and thus these employees
"may be exposed" to hazardous chemicals in the workplace.
2. Substances Covered.-OSHA set forth a base group of substances that are automatically covered by the HCS. Specifically, any
chemical listed in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200, subpart z or in Threshold
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 31852, 31860 (1987).
52 Fed. Reg. at 31861.
29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(c).
29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(c).
See Lyndon, supra note 4, at 1801 (discussing this proposition).
52 Fed. Reg. at 31860.
52 Fed. Reg. at 31861.
52 Fed. Reg. at 31861.
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Limit Value for Chemical Substances and Physical Agents in the
Workroom Environment with Intended Changes for 1979, as
amended from time to time, 69 or any chemical proven to be carcinogenic by the National Toxicology Program,7 0 the International
Agency for Research on Cancer, 1 or 29 C.F.R. Part 1910, Subpart
2, Toxic and Hazardous Substances, OSHA evaluated. 72 The HCS's
labeling requirement does not apply to any chemical substance regulated by another federal agency.73 In addition, the HCS does not
apply to substances such as hazardous waste, tobacco or tobacco
products, or wood or wood products.74
If a chemical does not fall within the base*group of substances
automatically covered by the HCS, the burden is on the manufacturer or importer to establish whether the chemical poses a health
hazard. 5 An employer is not required to evaluate any chemical to
determine whether it is hazardous, 76 but, rather, he or she may rely
on the evaluations made by the supplier. 77 The only time an employer will be required to evaluate a chemical is when he or she
chooses not to rely on the supplier's evaluation. 8
Unless an injured employee can successfully allege that the employer intentionally concealed hazardous information, the employee's
remedy against the employer is generally restricted to an action
brought under the workers' compensation system.7 9 However, there
69. This manual is published by the American Conference of Government Industrial
Hygienists.

70. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(d)(4)(i).
71. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(d)(4)(ii).
72. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(d)(4)(iii).
73. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(b)(6)(ii), (iii); e.g., (b)(5)(ii)(citing Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1989)); (b)(5)(iii)(citing Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-211 (1989)); (b)(5)(iv)(citing Federal Hazardous Substance Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1273 (1982)).

74. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(b)(6)(i), (ii), (iii). Wood dust, however, is subject to the
HCS. 52 Fed. Reg. 31852, 31862 (1987).
75. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(d)(1).
76. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(d)(1).

77. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(d)(I); see Carle, supra note 8 (discussing the potential
problems associated with reliance on the manufacturer for the data production and assess-

ment). The fact that the HCS is a "performance-oriented standard" places considerable responsibility on the supplier to perform adequate evaluations and to disseminate that data to
the next consumer of the hazardous substance, usually the employer. See generally id. at 58689. Simple problems of economics exist, however, creating disincentives for manufacturers to
release product ingredients and to provide careful hazard warnings. Id.

78. Id.
79.

But see Stillman & Wheeler, The Expansion of OccupationalSafety and Health

Law, 62 NOTRE DAME L. Rav. 969, 1004 (1987) (outlining three exceptions that workers may
use to sue in tort).
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is an intentional harm exception to the workers' compensation
scheme which applies where the employer is found to have intentionally concealed health hazard information from the employee.80 For
example, in Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court,8' the .California Supreme Court permitted tort recovery
for exacerbation of initial injuries sustained by an employee as a result of chemical exposure where the exacerbation was caused by the
concealment of the health hazard information, including concealment of the diagnosis of the illness by the company physician. 2 The
Court refused to allow recovery in tort for the initial injuries allegedly resulting from the concealment of the health hazard information; the employee's remedy remained within the parameters of the
workers' compensation scheme.83
Also, the employee may be able to sue the manufacturer under
the theory of strict liability, but proving a causal link between the
chemical exposure-assuming one can pinpoint the right chemical-and the resulting injury is a substantial obstacle. 4 In addition,
even assuming the injured employee can adequately demonstrate
causation, he or she must still locate the right manufacturer.85
Sometimes, depending on the number of manufacturers involved and
the type of chemicals involved, this task of locating the proper manufacturer may be difficult to complete.88 Despite the limited success of
seeking relief outside the workers' compensation scheme, the rise of
court actions by employees exposed to hazardous substances in the
workplace increases an employer's exposure to liability for these
80. Id. at 1005 (citing Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27
Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980)).
81. 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980).
82. 27 Cal. 3d at 473, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
83. Id. at 471, 612 P.2d at 954, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
84. See generally Carle, supra note 8, at 594 (stating that victims would be better able
to establish this link if manufacturers were to unveil their products' chemicals and dangers);
Annotation, Employer's Tort Liability to Worker for Concealing Workplace Hazard or Nature or Extent of Injury, 9 A.L.R. 4th 778, 783 (1988) (stating that in such a state as Arkansas, the courts have ruled that only where an employer acts with a deliberate, specific intent to
harm may the employee sue in tort); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW §§ 10-11 (McKinney 1990)
(stating that obligations may be purely statutory and that often the right to compensation does
not depend on the employer's negligence itself).
85. See generally Carle, supra note 8, at 588 (claiming that, because workers have
trouble identifying the responsible manufacturer, the tort system cannot easily impose liability
on them).
86. See id. However, some jurisdictions allow joint and several strict liability if the employee can locate the pool of manufacturers potentially liable but cannot allocate percentages
of fault. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132 (1980).
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workplace hazards.87
3. "Article" Exemption.-It is worth noting that the HCS
contains an exemption for "articles". 8 An "article" is defined as a:
manufactured item ...[w]hich is formed to a specific shape or
design during manufacture; . . . which has end use function(s) dependent in whole or in part upon its shape or design during end
use; and . . . which does not release, or otherwise result in exposure to, a hazardous chemical, under normal conditions of use."
Articles may be: office products, such as pens and pencils, emissions
from tires when in use, emissions from toner in pieces of paper, and
emissions from newly varnished furniture.90 The listed emissions fall
within the exemptions because the HCS does not encompass releases
of small quantities of chemicals that pose no greater hazard in the
workplace than they would with normal use at home.9"
It should also be noted that the article exemption only applies to
end use.92 Articles with intermediate uses which result in exposure
are covered.93 An example of an article with an intermediate use is
encapsulated asbestos insulation where installation involves hammering the material into openings, thus releasing the asbestos. 94 In this
case, the installation is the "normal condition of use" and thus hazard information would be required.9 5 Once installed, the encapsulated asbestos insulation would be an article and thus exempted.9"
4. Consumer Products Exemption.-The revised HCS also exempts consumer products where "the employer can demonstrate it is
used in the workplace in the same manner as normal consumer use,
and which results in a duration and frequency of exposure which is
not greater than exposures experienced by consumers. . . . OMB
has objected to this provision on the ground that "this exemption
87. See generally Carle, supra note 8, at 585-86 (writing that, because unveiling products' ingredients would identify a warning's inadequacy, manufacturers would have greater
incentive to allow more protective warnings in the face of greater chances of being sued or
fined).
88. OSHA, Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.59(b)(6)(iv)(1988).
89. OSHA, Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.59(c)(i), (ii). (iii) (1988).
90. 52 Fed. Reg. 31852, 31862 (1987).
91. Id. OMB has suggested that the definition of "article" be modified to clarify further
the exemption for items which release very small quantities of chemicals. 52 Fed. Reg. at
46078. OMB recommends an objective "de minimis" exemption. Id.
92. 52 Fed. Reg. at 46078.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.59(b)(6)(vii) (1988).
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would continue to place under the HCS large numbers of consumer
products for which MSDSs would have little practical utility, and
for which the burden of compliance would be substantial."98 Consequently, OMB recommends a broader exemption which would cover
"any substance packaged in the same form and concentration as a
consumer product whether
or not it is used for the same purpose as
'99
the consumer product.
There are potential problems with characterizing which products are consumer products under the OMB's approach. It would
seem more efficient to follow the HCS because the Consumer Product Safety Act' 00 already governs labeling and other information disclosure requirements associated with the majority of widely known
consumer products. 01' To broaden the exemption, as OMB suggests,
may create gaps in information-gathering and dissemination because
not all substances that are packaged in the identical manner as consumer goods are covered by the Consumer Product Safety Act; in
fact, there is no proof that by broadening the exemption, duplicative
efforts would be minimized.
5. Drug Exemption.-Another exemption to the HCS which
OMB believes is not sufficiently broad applies to drugs in "solid, final form for direct administration to the patient . . ."o0MB objects to this exemption, contending that there is no reason why all
drugs regulated by the Food and Drug Administration should not be
exempted because such regulation would be sufficient protection.0 3
Contrary to the suggestion in the previous paragraph addressing the
broader consumer product exemption proposed by OMB, it is likely,
based on the rather expansive definition of "drug" in the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 104 that a broad exemption for all
98. 52 Fed. Reg. at 46078.
99. Id.
100.

15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1985).

101.

Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1926.59(b)(5)(iv) (1988) (including within this group

those products that are also hazardous substances).
102. 52 Fed. Reg. at 46078.

103. Id.
104. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(1982).
The term "drug" means (A) articles recognized in the official United States
Pharmacopoeia, official Homoeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; and (B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease

in man or other animals; and (C) articles . . . intended to affect the structure or
any function of the body of man or other animals; and (D) articles intended for use
as a component of any article specified in clauses (A), (B), or (C). .
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drugs would not leave any gaps in data collection, hazard labeling,
and enforcement.
C. Disclosure
Every employer covered by the HCS must develop a written
hazard communication program that includes the use of labels,
MSDSs, and employee information and training. 105 The written hazard communication program must also contain a list of the hazardous chemicals in each work area, and the methods by which the employer will inform employees of the hazards of unusual or unique
tasks.108 The employer may rely on an existing communication program, provided it meets the above requirements. 0 7 The written hazard communication program must be made available, upon request,
to employees, their designated representatives, the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, and the Director of
NIOSH. 10 8
1. Labels.-Chemical manufacturers, importers and distributors must be sure each container of hazardous chemicals leaving the
workplace is properly labeled. 0 9 The label must include the following information: "i) [the] [i]dentity of the hazardous chemical(s); ii)
[a]ppropriate hazard warnings; and iii) [the] [n]ame and address of
the chemical manufacturer, importer, or other responsible party."'110
A "hazard warning" is defined as any "words, pictures, symbols, or
combination thereof appearing on a label or other appropriate form
of warning which convey the hazard(s) of the chemical(s) in the
container(s).'"' At a minimum, the employer is responsible to ensure that each container of hazardous chemicals in the workplace is
tagged or marked with the identity of the hazardous chemical and
its respective hazard warnings." 2 Labels must be "legible, in English, and prominently displayed on the container, or readily available in the work area. . . 3 Employers whose employees speak
languages other than English are not required to add the information
in the employee's language."
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

29
29
29
29
29

C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.

at
at
at
at
at

§
§
§
§
§

1926.59(e)(1).
1926.59(e)(1)(i), (ii).
1926.59(e)(3).
1926.59(e)(4).
1926.59(f)(1).

110. 29 C.F.R. at

§ 1926.59(f)(1)(i), (ii), (iii).

111.

§

29 C.F.R. at

112. 29 C.F.R. at
113. 29 C.F.R. at
114.

1926.59(c).

§ 1926.59(f)(5)(i), (ii).
§ 1926.59(f)(9).

Id. Consequently, there could be a serious problem in training, education, and/or
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2. MSDS.-Chemical manufacturers and importers must "obtain or develop an [MSDS] for each hazardous chemical they produce or import," 115 and must provide the MSDS at the time of the
initial shipment to the distributor or employer.""' Distributors must
also ensure that downstream employers are provided with the
MSDS. 117 Among other regulations, each MSDS must be in English
and include information concerning the specific identity of the hazardous chemicals (subject to the restrictions on trade secrets) and
their common names." 8 In addition, the physical and chemical characteristics of the hazardous chemicals,"19 (such as known acute and
chronic health effects), the fact whether the chemical is considered
to be a carcinogen, 2 0 any precautionary measures,12' emergency and
first aid procedures, 22 and the identification of the party who prepared or distributed the MSDS, l2a must be included.
Although downstream employers may rely on upstream suppliers to provide the MSDS, it is every employer's responsibility to re1 24
quest an MSDS if he has not received one from the supplier. If
the label indicates a hazard, the employer will know that an MSDS
is needed, and that he should request one. 25 In addition, employers
are required to "maintain copies of the required MSDS for each
hazardous chemical in the workplace, and shall ensure that the
[MSDS is] readily accessible ...to employees when they are in
their work area."' 26
3. Employee Training and Information.-Employers must
provide their employees with information and training on two occasions: when the employees are initially assigned to a work area containing hazardous chemicals, 27 and "whenever a new hazard is inunderstanding of hazard labels if a high percentage of the employees at a given workplace
speak English only as a second language.
115. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(g)(1).

116.

29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(g)(6).

117.

29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(g)(7).

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

29
29
29
29
29
29

124.

29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(g)(6).

C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.

at § 1926.59(g)(2)(i)(A), (B).
at § 1926.59(2)(C)(3)(ii).
at § 1926.59(g)(2)(C)(3)(vii).
at § 1926.59(g)(2)(C)(3)(viii).
at § 1926.59(g)(2)(C)(3)(X).
at § 1926.59(g)(2)(C)Q(3)(vii).

125. Id. Furthermore, if the employer later learns of any possible hazards, this information should be added to the MSDS within three months. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(g)(5).
126. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(g)(8). For a discussion of potential problems for employers
who place mistaken reliance on the supplier's information, leading to exposure to tort liability,
see supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
127. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(h).
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troduced into their work area."' 28 The employees must be informed
of the requirements of the HCS, 129 any procedures in their work
area where hazardous chemicals are located,' 30 and the "location
and availability of the written hazard communication
program ... "13a
Employee training must include the following: 1) methods to
discover the presence or release of a hazardous chemical in the work
place;' 32 2) the physical and health hazards of the chemicals found
in the work place; 3' 3) means that employees can use to protect
themselves; 3 4 and 4) "the details of the written hazard communication program developed by the employer, including an explanation of
the labeling system and [the MSDS] ... .
D.

Trade Secrets

One potential problem with the formulation and dissemination
of hazard information through the MSDS is the disclosure of trade
secrets of substances contained within the MSDS. A "trade secret"
is defined as any "confidential formula, pattern, process, device, information or compilation of information that is used in an employer's business, and that gives the employer an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors ..

."36 The HCS provides that

the chemical manufacturer, importer or employer concerned with
protecting a trade secret may withhold the specific chemical identity
of a hazardous chemical from the MSDS upon the satisfaction of
four criteria. 7 The four criteria are: 1) the trade secret claim con128. Id.
129. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(h)(1)(i).
130. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(h)(1)(ii).
131. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(h)(1)(iii); see also O'Reilly, supra note 4, at 94-95 (noting
that employees who are informed of hazards in the workplace may assume the risk of injury,
creating an affirmative defense against products liability claims).
132. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(h)(2)(i).
133. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(h)(2)(ii).
134. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(h)(2)(iii).
135. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(h)(2)(iv). From the employee's standpoint, the HCS permits "the employee to evaluate what risks he is willing to bear in a particular job and to try to
effect changes, e.g., through his union, if he desires. If an employee elects to remain in a
particular job that presents potential health or safety risks, an understanding of those risks
should lead to his greater care in following suppliers' handling and industrial hygiene recommendations on labels and MSDSs .. " Stillman & Wheeler, supra note 79, at 979. Hence,
proper compliance by an employer not only reduces his exposure to legal liability, but also
enables employees to help themselves ensure safe and productive working hours.
136. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(c).
137. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(h)(2)(i)(1).
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cerning the information can be supported; 13 8 2) "the information
contained in the [MSDS] concerning the properties and effects of
the hazardous chemical is disclosed;"' 39 3) "the [MSDS] indicates
that the specific chemical identity is being withheld as a trade secret;" 140 and 4) "the specific chemical identity is made available to
health professionals, employees, and designated representatives
[under certain conditions] ...
"I"
In a situation that is deemed an emergency by the treating physician or nurse, the specific chemical identity of the trade secret
chemical must be released to the treating physician or nurse. 142 "The
chemical manufacturer, importer or employer, [however], may require a written statement of need and confidentiality agreement...
43
as soon as circumstances permit.'
In a non-emergency situation, and upon request, the specific
chemical identity of a trade secret chemical can be disclosed to a
physician providing medical care to an exposed employee, and to the
employee or his designated representative, if: 1) the request is written; 4 2) it specifies the occupational health need for the request; 145
3) it explains why disclosure of the specific chemical identity is necessary and why other information, such as the properties and effects
of the chemical, would not allow the health professional to render
needed services; 48 4) it describes the procedures to maintain the
confidentiality of the information; 4 7 and 5) the person making the
request agrees to keep the information confidential.' 48 These requirements would appear sufficient to maintain confidentiality of the trade
secret and, at the same time, to afford disclosure of the necessary
information to the inquiring party.
If the chemical manufacturer, importer or employer denies a
request for a specific chemical identity, the health professional, employee or designated representative may refer both the request and
denial to OSHA for review.' 49 OSHA will then determine whether
the trade secret claim has been supported by the chemical manufac138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

29 C.F.R.
29 C.F.R.
29 C.F.R.
29 C.F.R.
29 C.F.R.
Id.
29 C.F.R.
29 C.F.R.
29 C.F.R.
29 C.F.R.
29 C.F.R.
29 C.F.R.

at § 1926.59(h)(2)(i)(1)(i).
at § 1926.59(h)(2)(i)(1)(ii).
at § 1926.59(h)(2)(i)(1)(iii).
at § 1926.59(h)(2)(i)(1)(iv).
at § 1926.59(h)(i)(2).
at
at
at
at
at
at

§
§
§
§
§
§

1926.59(h)(i)(3)(i).
1926.59(h)(i)(3)(ii).
1926.59(h)(i)(3)(iii).
1926.59(h)(i)(3)(iii)(D)(iv).
1926.59(h)(i)(3)(iii)(D)(v).
1926.59(h)(i)(8).
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turer, importer or employer, whether the claim of the medical need
by the health professional, employee or designated representative has
been supported, and whether the health professional, employee or
designated representative has demonstrated sufficient protection of
the name's confidentiality.15 If OSHA finds for the employee, or the
medical personnel, the refusing party will be subject to citation by
OSHA. 5 1
The citation may be contested before the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission. 52 If the information continues to
be withheld during the contest, an "Administrative Law Judge may
review the citation and supporting documentation in camera or issue
appropriate orders to protect the confidentiality of such matters."'' 3
E. Penalties
The OSH Act has both civil and criminal penalties for the violation of its provisions.' If an employer willfully or repeatedly violates any OSHA standard, he may be assessed a maximum civil penalty of $10,000 for each violation.155 A "willful violation" has been
defined as "an act done voluntarily with either an intentional disregard of, or plain indifference to, [OSHA regulations]. .

. ."I"

A ci-

tation for a "serious" violation carries a mandatory penalty of up to
$1,000 for each such violation.' 57 A "serious" violation occurs when
there is a:
substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could
result from a condition which exists, or from one or more practices,
means, methods, operations, or processes which have been adopted
or are in use.

. .

unless the employer did not, and could'not with

150.

29 C.F.R. at

§

151.

29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(h)(i)(10).

152.

29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(h)(i)(11).

1926.59(h)(i)(9)(i), (ii), (iii).

153. Id.
154. 29 U.S.C.A. § 666 (West 1985). The penalties range from $1000 fines to imprison-

ment of one year. Id.
155. 29 U.S.C.A. § 666(a) (West 1985). In 1984, Congress raised the monetary penalty
for all federal crimes. The maximum fine for a misdemeanor resulting in death is now

$250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for corporations. See Note, Getting Away with Murder:
Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal Prosecutionsfor Industrial Accidents, 101
HARV. L. REv. 535, 538 n.20 [hereinafter Getting Away with Murder]; 18 U.S.C. § 3623
(Supp. III 1985). A high level Justice Department official has asserted that these fines would

apply to OSHA regulations (but the issue has not yet been tested). See Safety Violations
Resulting in Death Punishable by High Fines, Official Says, 17 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 12,
at 483 (Aug. 19, 1987).
156. Cedar Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 587 F.2d 1303, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1978)(quoting the

Secretary of Labor and the Commission).
157.

29 U.S.C.A. § 666(b) (West 1985).
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the exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the presence of the
violation.Y58
For violations that are not "serious," the employer may be assessed a
maximum penalty of $1,000 for each such violation. 15 9 If an employer is cited for violating an OSHA standard and fails to correct
the violation, he may be assessed a $1,000 penalty each day, if such
60
failure to correct continues.'
Criminal penalties may be incurred upon a willful violation that
causes death to an employee,' 6 ' or upon making false statements in
any application, report or document filed or required to be maintained.162 Each violation carries a maximum mandatory fine of
$10,000 or imprisonment for a maximum of six months, or both. 6 3
A serious problem is that OSHA has too few inspectors to ensure effective compliance. 64 As of 1988, the number of OSHA inspectors declined to approximately 1,000, making it incapable of inspecting more than two percent of all firms it regulates each year. 6 5
"Union officials, members of Congress, and others have roundly
complained that the [Reagan] administration [took] the teeth out of
OSHA [by] .

.

. gutting its enforcement efforts."' 6 In fact, "in

practice, OSHA has only rarely applied the available criminal sanctions.' 67 As the Bush administration has pushed to maintain the
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

29 U.S.C.A. § 666(k)
29 U.S.C.A. § 666(c)
29 U.S.C.A. § 666(d)
29 U.S.C.A. § 666(e)
29 U.S.C.A. § 666(g)
Id.
See Carle, supra note

(West
(West
(West
(West
(West

1985).
1985).
1985).
1985).
1985).

8, at 591 n.66.

165. Id.
166.

See Getting Away with Murder, supra note 155, at 540 (footnote omitted).

167. Id. at 538 (footnote omitted). However, a bill has been introduced before Congress
in an effort to improve criminal enforcement by OSHA. Statement by Sen. Howard Metzenbaum and Rep. Tom Lantos, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at A-10 (Feb. 22, 1990). Senator Howard Metzenbaum and Representative Tom Lantos jointly introduced the proposed
OSHA Criminal Penalty Reform Act on February 24, 1990. Id. The proposed act "would

strengthen the criminal penalties by expanding the application of criminal sanctions to willful
violations that result in serious bodily injury to workers or recklessly endanger human
life.
... Id.
Under the bill, "the penalty for a willful violation by an employer that leads to loss of

human life would be increased from six months' imprisonment to up to 10 years' imprisonment. See id. The measure also would expressly preserve the right of state and local authorities to prosecute violatorsunder state or local law." Id. Further "an employer who willfully
violates an OSHA standard that causes serious bodily injury to a worker can be punished by a
fine and up to seven years in prison. An employer whose willful violations recklessly endanger

human life can be punished by a fine and up to five years in prison." Id.
Senator Metzenbaum notes that OSHA had referred only 42 cases to the Justice Depart-
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status quo, it is unlikely that OSHA enforcement efforts and resources will improve, at least in the foreseeable future."'
F.

Compliance with the HCS

When OMB disapproved the expanded HCS in October 1987, it
suggested the development of "a generic hazard communication pro-

gram or guidelines suitable for the development of generic programs
by the private sector and by States, which could perhaps be certified
as meeting the requirements of HCS."' 9 In response, OSHA included as an appendix to its proposal non-mandatory compliance
guidelines designed to facilitate compliance. 7 0 OSHA also has developed training programs on common workplace hazards which are
available on videotape or in person at all OSHA regional and area
offices. 1 1 Other resources include the assignment of HCS coordinators in OSHA's regional offices, on-site consultation programs, and
the availability of New Directions grant awards to help industries

develop hazard communication materials.

2

ment for possible criminal action during the agency's first 18 years. See id. In contrast, over
the last three years, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Justice Department together have prosecuted over 400 cases involving environmental crimes. Id. Representative
Lantos added, "There are some employers who willfully and recklessly expose workers to toxic
substances and dangerous working conditions. This bill puts teeth into the OSH Act. Unlike
civil fines which can be passed on as part of the cost of doing business, the prospect of criminal
prosecution and imprisonment will do much to ensure that workplaces are safe and healthful."
Id.
168. However, Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole appears to be showing some commitment to occupational safety and health, as is demonstrated by the administration's fiscal 1991
funding request of $287.9 million-about $20.9 million more than OSHA's final fiscal 1990
budget. OSHA Funding Request, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at C-1 (Feb. 12, 1990).
The Department of Labor "notes that the additional money will be spent on hiring more inspectors, improving the agency's enforcement efforts to combat ergonomic injuries in
meatpacking and general industry, improving safety and health statistics, and upgrading the
agency's main computer system." Id. at C-2. On the other hand, some skeptical of the Bush
administration efforts indicate that half of the funding increase is for built-in cost increases
that affect every federal government agency. Whether the increase is substantial or not, this
action by Dole and the Department of Labor does demonstrate some renewed commitment to
health and safety in the workplace. In any event, the impact of this renewed commitment will
likely be minimal in the foreseeable future, especially as it affects OSHA enforcement of the
HCS.
169. Technical Amendments, 52 Fed. Reg. 46077 (1987).
170. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Public Hearing, 53 Fed. Reg.
29582-86 (1988).
171. OSHA Develops 10 Training Programs,Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 71, at A-14
(Apr. 13, 1988).
172. In addition, OSHA has published several reports that can be obtained through
OSHA's Publications Office, Room N-3101, 200 Constitution Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C.
20210, (202) 523-9667, to aid employers with meeting compliance guidelines. E.g., OSHA,
Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.59 (1988).
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OSHA's success in ensuring that employers comply with the
HCS has been mixed. Under the HCS, employers are required to
establish hazard communication programs that transmit information
on chemical hazards to workers through container labels, material
safety data sheets and training programs. Despite OSHA's efforts to
assist employers in complying with the HCS requirements, alleged
violations of the HCS have been prevalent. 17 3 The HCS' requirement
that employers develop, implement, and maintain written hazard
communication programs was the second most frequently cited
OSHA violation by inspectors in fiscal year 1988 and the most frequently cited section under the HCS with a total of 6,342 violations. 74 It appears that employers are either intentionally stalling
compliance efforts or they just do not know what to do to create and
maintain an acceptable hazard communication program.175
Further, in March 1989, OSHA released data covering agency
inspections from November 1, 1985 through December 31, 1988.178
The information collected revealed that employers have been cited
for a total of 49,098 violations of the HCS since 1985.17 The agency
has imposed more than $24 million in penalties which has been reduced to slightly more than a half million dollars in post-inspection
settlement procedures.1 78 According to the OSHA data, the majority
of the violations--42,309-were "other than serious," while there
were 248 willful violations, 1,472 repeat violations and 6,009 serious
violations. 9
The majority of employers cited were charged with violating
four major provisions.18 0 Notably, compliance with the HCS was not
173. Id.
174. OSHA Notice Violations Most Often Cited in 1988, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
40, at A-5 (Mar. 2, 1989) [hereinafter OSHA Notice Violations]; OSHA Issued Over 18,000
Citations In FY 1988 For Violations of Hazard Communication Rule, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 32, at A-1 (Feb. 17, 1989).

175. See Carle, supra note 8, at 586-92.
176. See OSHA Notice Violations, supra note 174.
177. OSHA Says It Has Found 49,098 Violations of Hazard Communication Standard
Since '85, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at A-7 (Mar. 16, 1989) [hereinafter Violations of
Hazard Communication Standard].
178. Id.
179. Id.

180. These provisions are:
1) 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(e)(1) (1986), which requires employers to develop,

implement, and maintain a written hazard communication program for the
workplace;
2) 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(h) (1986), which requires that employers provide

workers with new information and training on hazards in their work area when
they first begin their jobs, and whenever a new hazard is introduced into the
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checked during programmed inspections in construction establishments until March 1989.181 Other small employers were given additional time to comply with the HCS. 182 In short, now that the Dole
case has been decided by the Supreme Court, all provisions are fully
in effect, and employers will be cited if they fail to comply with the
three provisions previously disapproved by OMB.183
G.

The HCS and Anticipated Legislative Reaction

In 1988, Congress began to address concerns about employer
compliance with the HCS with respect to the impact of the standard
on small businesses. In September 1988, the House Small Business
Subcommittee on Exports, Tourism and Special Problems conducted
hearings to address the effect of the HCS on small businesses. 8 4
More recently, in June 1989, Senator Dale Bumpers, chairman of
the Senate Committee on Small Business, held hearings on this issue. 185 Representatives of small businesses and trade groups testified
that the HCS imposes tremendous paperwork and costs on small
businesses. 88 They also stated that many small business employers
are not aware of the standard at all, do not have the training to
understand it, and do not belong to trade associations that could help
87
them understand it.'
In response, OSHA representatives stated that several provisions of the HCS were tailored to small businesses and that small
businesses in the manufacturing industry have almost a 52 percent
compliance rate, compared to a rate of almost 59 percent for manufacturing businesses of all sizes.' 88
work area;
3) 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(f)(4) (1986), which requires that employers label
hazardous chemicals regulated under other substance-specific OSHA standards
(such as OSHA's formaldehyde and benzene exposure standards) in accordance with those standards; and,
4) 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g)(I) (1986), which requires that chemical manufacturers and importers develop material safety data sheets, and that employers
have data sheets for each hazardous substance they use.
181. See Violations of Hazard Communication Standard, supra note 177.
182. Id.
183. Final Rule: Technical Amendments and Notice Regarding Enforcement, 54 Fed.
Reg. 6886 (1989).
184. Right-To-Know Too Burdensome, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 190, at A-1 (Sept.
30, 1988).
185. Bumpers Criticizes Burden on Small Business from HazardCommunication Standard's Paperwork, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 120, at A-4 (June 23, 1989).
186. Id. at A-5.
187. Id.
188. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

23

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 2
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 7:2

While there has been a call for Congressional action to modify
the HCS by small business interests, Senator Bumpers expects that
any modifications to the HCS will be handled directly by OSHA and
not through legislation.18 Both the House and Senate Small Business Committees have requested that the General Accounting Office
(hereinafter "GAO") investigate the effects of the HCS on small
business.190 The Senate Committee predicts that no substantive action will be taken on the matter until the GAO study is completed, a
process that could take up to a year. 191 At the present time, the committee plans to call for creation of an ombudsman for small businesses, consumer product labeling requirements similar to EPA standards rather than the MSDS, and other modifications similar to
those called for by OMB, rather than an outright exemption for
small businesses. 192 OSHA's position is that, "[w]hile small businesses may at times have difficulty complying with OSHA regulations, the OSH Act is clear that OSHA must use the most protective
means feasible to prevent material impairment to employees' health,
even though there are substantial costs associated with
93
compliance."'
III.

NEW YORK RIGHT TO KNOW LAW

A.

Background

The New York Right to Know Law (hereinafter "the New
York law") was enacted in 1980 in recognition "that there exists a
danger to the health of employees and their families throughout the
state because [of] hazardous exposure to toxic substances encountered during the course and scope of employment." 9 Indeed, "employees have an inherent right to know about the known and suspected health hazards which may result from working with toxic
substances ...

."

The New York law's purpose is to "ensure that

employees are given information by their employers concerning the
nature of toxic substances which they may encounter in the work189.
190.

Id.
Id.

191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id.
Id.

194. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 875, Legislative Findings; Declaration of Purpose, L. 1980, ch.
551, § 1 (McKinney 1988); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4800-4808 (McKinney 1985). The
New York Right to Know law is the combination of the New York Labor Law and the New
York Public Health Law.
195. Id.
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place. ....

9' Both the Department of Health and the Department

of Labor have
jurisdiction over toxic substance information in the
97
workplace.1
B. Comparison with the HCS
1. Scope.-The New York law, like the HCS, encompasses all
employers. 198 However, the term "employer" is not limited under the
New York law by any reference to chemical use, distribution or production.198 Rather, "employer" is defined as "any individual, partnership, corporation or association engaged in a business who has
employees including the state and its political subdivisions."200 The
New York law thus potentially covers more employers and, hence,
offers more employees protection than the HCS.
The New York law covers all substances listed in the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health registry of toxic effects
of chemical substances, or any substance which has yielded positive
evidence of acute or chronic health hazards in human, animal or
other biological testing.20' More restrictive than the New York law,
the HCS allows results of toxicological testing in animal populations
only when human epidemiological studies are not available. 2
Under the HCS, "hazardous chemicals" are defined as chemicals that are physical or health hazards. 0 " A "physical hazard"
may, for example, be a combustible liquid, a compressed gas or an
explosive flammable.20 4 A "health hazard" is a "chemical for which
there is statistically significant evidence . . . that acute or chronic

health effects may occur in exposed employees. 20 5 Unlike the HCS,
the New York law does not provide any exemptions for chemicals
that meet its definition of a toxic substance. 0 8 Consequently, the
196. N.Y. PUB.
197. N.Y. LAB.

HEALTH LAW § 4800 (McKinney 1985).
LAW § 876 (McKinney 1988); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW

§ 4802 (McKin-

ney 1985).
198. See Feitshans, supra note 12, at 703-07 (comparing provisions of state Right to

Know laws and the HCS); see also N.Y. LAB. LAW § 875 (McKinney 1988); "N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 4800 (McKinney 1985).
199. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 875(1) (McKinney 1988); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4801(3)
(McKinney 1985).
200. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 875 (McKinney 1988); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4800 (McKinney 1985).
201. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4801(2) (McKinney 1985).
202. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200, app. B. 932, 933 (1986).
203. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c) (1986).
204. Id.
205. Id. The term includes chemicals that are carcinogens, reproductive toxins, irritants
and corrosives. Id.
206. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4801(2) (McKinney 1985).
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New York law is again potentially more protective of employee
health than the HCS.
2. Disclosure.-The New York law provides the Department
of Health with the authority to implement "outreach programs" as
another method to inform employees of their inherent right to information regarding toxic substances. 0 7 Health officials are authorized
to maintain a supply of information leaflets in public buildings, including union halls, to help ensure that employees are informed of
the toxic substance program.208 In addition, the Department of
Health is to distribute periodically, to the print and air media, public
service announcements describing the outreach programs. 20 1 The
HCS contains no similar provision for governmental involvement in
the dissemination of hazardous chemical information.210
Moreover, unlike the HCS, the New York law requires an employer to post signs in the workplace to inform employees of their
right to toxic substance information and to describe the toxic effects
of these substances, and the circumstances under which these effects
are produced.2 ' The New York law also contains provisions similar
to the HCS for employee education and training. 12 The New York
law has an added requirement that the employer maintain medical
records for forty years. 3
a. Right to Strike.-The New York law provides that if an
employer does not provide the employee with the requested information within seventy-two hours, the employee is not required to work
with the toxic substance until the information is made available.2"4
This right is not explicitly guaranteed to employees under the HCS,
although OSHA affords them a right to refuse hazardous
employment. 215
207. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4804 (McKinney 1985).
208. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4804(3) (McKinney 1985).
209.

Id.

210. Governmental involvement may help minimize some of the disincentives manufacturers have in failing to label certain products and chemicals as "hazardous" and to disclose
the health risks associated with those chemicals. See supra text and accompanying notes 6566. State government agencies act as a check, promoting better disclosure by not relying solely
on the professional judgment of the manufacturer as supported by the "performance-oriented"
nature of the HCS.
211.
212.
213.

N.Y. LAB. LAW § 876(l) (McKinney 1988).
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 878 (McKinney 1988).
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 879 (McKinney 1988).

214. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 876(7) (McKinney 1988).
215.

See 29 U.S.C.A. § 660(c) (West 1985); see also Donovan v. Hahner, Foreman &

Harness, Inc., 736 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that the discharge of an employee by
reason of his refusal to use equipment he believed was both defective and hazardous violated
subsection 3 of section 660).
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In comparison, OSHA prohibits an employer from discharging
or discriminating against any employee who exercises "any right
protected by" the OSH Act. 16 The Secretary of Labor has promulgated a regulation providing an employee with the right to choose
not to perform an assigned task because of a reasonable apprehension of death or serious injury coupled with a belief that no less drastic alternative is available.2117 The Supreme Court has held this regulation to be a valid exercise of the Secretary's authority under the
OSH Act.218
The New York law also explicitly states that an employer shall
not discipline or discharge an employee exercising any of the rights
granted to him. 219 These rights include the right to request toxic substance information that the employer is required to provide in the
employee education and training program, 2 the right to strike,
since the employee may not be required to work with such substances,2 21 and the right to obtain the employer's record of the name
of every employee who handles or uses substances listed in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1200, subparagraph z.222 Indeed, a request by an employer
that an employee waive any rights under the New York law as a
condition of employment constitutes an act of discrimination. 23
b. Trade Secrets.-Like the HCS, the New York law provides broad protection of trade secrets. However, the procedural
mechanism to protect or to disclose trade secrets is somewhat differ216. Id. This is consistent with the policies underlying the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 185-188 (West 1985). See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co.,

370 U.S. 9 (1962) (stating that an employees' refusal to work in an area subject to poor
working conditions and extremely cold temperatures is a protected activity); Akron Paint &
Varnish Co., 293 NLRB 97 (1989) (holding that an employer had violated section 8(a)(3) for

discharging a union steward for his efforts, as a union spokesperson, to have employer improve
safety conditions in work place); Cargill Poultry Co., 292 NLRB 72 (1989) (holding that

employer violated section 8(a)(1) by suspending employees for walking out to protest low temperatures in their work area); TLT-Babcock, Inc., 293 NLRB 23 (1989) (holding that an

employer violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) by laying off two employees for their role in
preparing letters to employer expressing the workers' dissatisfaction with working conditions
and stating the possibility of their turning to unionization if the employer failed adequately to

address their concerns).
217. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1979).
218. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980) (holding that the regulation was
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor in the valid exercise of his authority under the Act and

conforms to the Act's fundamental objective of preventing occupational deaths and serious
injuries).
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

N.Y. LAB. LAW
N.Y. LAB. LAW
N.Y. LAB. LAW
N.Y. LAB. LAW
N.Y. LAB. LAW

§ 880(3) (McKinney 1988).
§ 878 (McKinney 1988).
§ 876(2) (McKinney 1988).
§ 879 (McKinney 1988).
§ 880(7) (McKinney 1988).
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ent. A New York employer who considers the identity of a toxic
substance to be a protected trade secret may register the information
as a secret with the Commissioner of Health (hereinafter the "Commissioner"), provided the information is either already registered as
a trade secret pursuant to federal law, or the information, though
unregistered, is related to a proprietary process that if disclosed,
would compromise his competitive position.22 Hence, the procedure
in New York is executed through the Commissioner and not solely
through the employer.
The Commissioner is not allowed to release such information
unless he notifies the employer first and gives him thirty days to respond 25 The employer is not required to divulge the specific identity
of the substance to the employee, only its toxic effects. 2 Any release by the Commissioner of information disclosing a trade secret
must be made pursuant to trade secret law or the Freedom of Information Act.227 Notably, the New York law contains no provisions for
the release of the specific chemical identity, either in an emergency
or non-emergency situation. In contrast, the HCS requires the disclosure of the chemical identity under limited circumstances where
the confidentiality of the trade secret is maintained. 28
The New York Labor Law also affords employers strong protection against disclosure. Section 877(1) states that "[w]hen a manufacturer, producer, formulator or employer considers the identity of
or other information concerning a toxic chemical substance to be a
protectable trade secret or a proprietary process whose disclosure
would compromise his competitive advantage[,] . . . he may register

this information as secret with the commissioner of health. 229 Thus,
the similar language of the New York Labor law and the New York
Public Health Law reinforces protection afforded to employers.
The Department of Health (hereinafter the "Department") has
also issued administrative regulations concerning trade secrets. 30
The Department cannot disclose any information likely to jeopardize
any trade secret registered with it unless the Department determines
that "disclosure is necessary to protect against an unreasonable risk
of injury to the health of an employee or of the public."' 23 1 Similar to
224. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4805(1) (McKinney 1985).
225. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4805(2) (McKinney 1985).
226. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4805(3) (McKinney 1985).
227. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4805(2) (McKinney 1985).
228. See supra text and accompanying notes 137-43.
229. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 877(1) (McKinney 1988).
230. N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 72 (1988).
231. N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 72.4 (1988).
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the New York Public Health Law, the Department may not release

any information disclosing a trade secret or proprietary process unless the registrant is first notified of the intent to disclose. 2 ' The

registrant must give written consent to release the information; even
then, the Department may not release such information until thirty

days after the registrant is so notified.2"'
3. Penalties.-To enforce the mandates of the New York law,

the New York Labor Law has both civil and criminal penalties for
the violation of its provisions. 34 The ceiling in civil penalties is
$10,000, exclusive of other damages for which an employer may be
liable under other provisions of law. 235 A willful and intentional violation constitutes a misdemeanor.23 6 A first offense conviction carries
a maximum fine of $500, or imprisonment for a maximum of thirty
days, or both a fine and imprisonment. 37
In addition to civil and criminal penalties under the New York
Labor Law, New York state prosecutors have brought criminal
charges against corporations under the penal laws for failing to prevent exposure of employees to hazardous substances and for concealing health risks from employees.238 Under New York Penal Law, a
232. N.Y. COsNP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 72.5 (1988).
233. Id.
234. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 882(1), (2) (McKinney 1988). The New York Public Health
Law has virtually no enforcement provisions.
In addition, state prosecution for corporate criminal conduct for actions in exposing employees to hazardous chemicals is on the rise. See Magnuson & Leviton, Policy Considerations
in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions After People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc., 62 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 913 (1987).
Whether the OSH Act preempts state criminal prosecutions has been much debated, and
is still unresolved. Id. at 926-28 & 938 n. 119; see Getting Away With Murder,supra note 127;
see also Kendall, Criminal Prosecutions at Odds with the OSH Act?, OCCUPATIONAL
HAZARDS, Oct. 1986, at 62-63; Kendall, Criminal Charges on the Rise for Workplace Injuries, Deaths, OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS, Dec. 1985, at 49; McClory, Murder on the Shop
Floor,ACROSS THE BOARD, June 1986, at 82; PlantExecutives for Mercury Poisoning,AFLCIO News, Oct. 25, 1986, at 6 (discussing the mercury poisoning of a worker in Pymm Thermometer Co., and noting that a set of facts was uncovered that bears a striking resemblance to

those in Film Recovery Systems, where "[a]gency failure, a pattern of deception by the employer, and ignorance of the workforce led to permanent brain damage to an employee."). See
Magnuson & Leviton, supra, at 938 n.119.
235. Although the New York law contains no overall agency enforcement scheme, and
no regulations have been issued by the Department of Labor or the Department of Health to
fill that gap, the Attorney General is authorized to enforce the mandates of section 882(1),
without prior investigation and determination by the Department of Labor. State v. Consolidated Edison Co., 133 Misc. 2d 57, 59, 506 N.Y.S.2d 819, 821 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
236. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 882(1) (McKinney 1988).
237. Id.
238. People v. Pymm, 151 A.D.2d 133, 546 N.Y.S.2d 871, 873 (App. Div. 1989); see
N.Y. Penal Law §§ 20.20, 20.25, 105.05, 175.10, 120.20 (McKinney 1987); see also People v.
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corporation can be criminally liable when it fails to carry out a specific duty required by law.239 In addition, the individual who engages
in the conduct for which the corporation can be held liable may also
be held criminally liable to the same extent as if the conduct were
carried out on his own behalf.24 0 These state enforcement alternatives could prove more effective and damaging to New York employers than OSHA enforcement. Indeed, the lack of administrative enforcement of workplace safety standards, on the state and federal
level, is the major factor that led prosecutors to utilize the state
criminal laws to protect employees and the public from the misconduct of corporations and their officers.
IVw

PREEMPTION

A.

The Doctrine

To understand the impact of the revised HCS on the New York
Right to Know law, it is necessary to understand the law of federal
preemption in general, and how these specific federal and state statutes both support and undercut one another.
In broad fashion, the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution24' has been interpreted to mean that when a state statute conflicts with a federal statute, the state statute must give
way. 242 In addition, state laws can be preempted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes.243
B. Standards
Congress may preempt state law either explicitly or implicitly
through a statute's structure and purpose.2 44 Explicit preemption occurs when the express language of the federal law conflicts with state
Harris, 74 Misc. 353, 363 (Ct. of Gen. Sess., N.Y. City 1911) (where an employer was indicted for manslaughter after 100 workers died while trapped in his locked building).
239. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.20(2)(9) (McKinney 1987).
240. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.25 (McKinney 1987).
241.

U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.

242. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746-47 (1981) (where the plaintiffs argue
that the First-Use Tax violates the Supremacy Clause because it interferes with federal regulation of the transportation and sale of gas in interstate commerce, and the Court concurred).
243. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941) (where the Court held that the
power to restrict, limit, regulate and register aliens as a distinct group is not a perpetual and
equal concurrent power of the state and the nation, but that the power of the state is
subordinate to supreme national power).
244. Jones v. Rath Packaging Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (wherein the Court held that
the Constitution does not allow a state law to prevent the implementation of the full purpose
and objectives of Congress).
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law on the subject.24 5 Such a conflict can occur in one of two ways:
the state law directly contradicts the language of the federal law, or
the federal law includes a state law preemptive provision. 246
Congressional intent to preempt may be inferred where the
scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make
reasonable the inference that Congress "left no room" for supplementary state regulation. 247 However, comprehensiveness alone is insufficient to justify preemption. 248 Preemption of a whole field will be
inferred where the field is one in which federal interests are so strong
that they presumably preclude the enforcement of state laws on that
issue. 249 Where Congress has not completely displaced state regulation, state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with
federal law.2 50 Such a conflict arises when "compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,"' 251 or when
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 25 2
C.

The HCS

In United Steelworkers of America v. Auchter 2 53 New York's
petition for review of the HCS in the Second Circuit was consolidated in one case with the petitions of Massachusetts, Illinois and
several interest groups. 254 Before this case, the HCS was restricted
to manufacturing employers. 255 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
245. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation, 461 U.S. 190,
203 (1983).
246. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (citing Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983)).
247. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (implementing a test
that turns on whether the action over which the State claims to have the power to act is in any
way regulated by the Federal Act).
248. Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 855 F.2d 48, 58 (2d Cir.
1988) (holding that the OSH Act and OSHA's Revised Construction Standard allows states to
regulate when the purpose is to protect the public, not specific occupational hazards).
249. Pharmaceutical Society of New York v. Lefkowitz, 586 F.2d 953, 958 (2d Cir.
1987).
250. Id. at 53.
251. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (stating that section 792 of the California Agricultural Code was not superseded by the Supremacy
Clause because there was no evidence of Congressional preemption in the field, and that there
was no conflict between the state and the federal regulations which would not allow them to
stand together).
252. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
253. 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985).
254. Id. at 736.
255. Id. at 731. The panel of judges consisted of Third Circuit Judge Gibbons, Chief
Judge Fisher of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, and District
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held that the HCS preempted state hazard communication rules as
they applied to employees in the manufacturing sector."' 6
However, because the scope of the HCS has been expanded to
include "all employees," 257 the areas in which state laws will be preempted have also been expanded. 58 Indeed, the HCS contains an
express preemptive provision. It states that the HCS is "intended to
address comprehensively the issue of evaluating the potential
hazards of chemicals, and communicating information concerning
hazards and appropriate protective measures to employees, and to
preempt any legal requirements of a state . . . pertaining to the
259

subject.
According to the OSH Act, a state may assert jurisdiction over
"any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which no
standard is in effect. .. ."10 On the other hand, where OSHA has

issued a standard, the states are preempted from asserting jurisdiction over the issue addressed by that standard, unless a federally approved state plan is in effect.26x
In addition, the Third Circuit has held the HCS to be a standard and not a regulation.262 The characterization of the HCS as a
2 63
standard or regulation affects its preemptive effect on state laws.
For example, the preemptive effect of an OSHA regulation is not
explicitly dealt with in the OSH Act. 264 Thus, implied preemption
would have to be employed. 265 As noted above, however, the effect of
a standard is the preemption of state law until federal approval is
obtained.266
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals based its characterization
of the HCS as a standard on the Fifth Circuit's distinction between
Judge Kelly of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
256. Id. at 743.

257. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the promulgation on August
24, 1987 of the HCS, making it applicable to all employers inside and outside the manufacturing sector).
258. For literature discussing the preemption issue, see supra, note 12.
259. 29 C.F.R. § 1426.59(a)(2) (1988).
260. 29 U.S.C.A. § 667(a) (West 1985).
261. 29 U.S.C.A. § 667(a), (b) (West 1985); 29 C.F.R. § 1926.59(a)(2) (1988); Final
Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 31852, 31860 (1987).
262. Auchter, 763 F.2d at 735; see also 29 U.S.C.A. § 655 (West 1985). But see Entployee Right to Know, supra note 5, at 654-61 (1985) (discussing that the HCS is not a

standard within the meaning of the OSH Act and thus cannot have preemptive effect).
263. Auchter, 763 F.2d at 733.

264. Id. at 734.
265. Id.
266. 29 U.S.C.A. § 667(a), (b) (West 1985); 29 C.F.R. § 1926.59(a)(2) (1988); Final
Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 31852, 31860 (1987).
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an OSHA standard and regulation.2 67 A standard "reasonably purports to correct a particular 'significant risk'" while a regulation is a
"[mere] enforcement or detection procedure designed to further the
goals of the [OSH] Act generally." 2 " The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals found that inadequate communication is itself a hazard
which the HCS can mitigate.26 9 The risk of harm from chemicals in
the workplace can be diminished by direct warnings to employers. 70
Finally, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals afforded OSHA "some
degree of deference" regarding OSHA's interpretation of the OSH
1

Act.

27

In the Summary and Explanation of the Final Standard Section
of the Revised Regulations, OSHA states that:
[T]he express preemption provisions of the [OSH] Act apply to all
state or local laws which relate to an issue covered by a Federal
standard, without regard to whether the state law would conflict
with, complement, or supplement the Federal standard, and without regard to whether the state law appears to be 'at least as effec27 21
tive as' the Federal standard.

The "at least as effective" test is employed by OSHA in determining
whether a state plan should be approved. 73 Specifically, the Secre-

tary of Labor must approve a state plan if its standards, in her judgment, will be at least as effective in providing safe and healthful em-

ployment as the HCS.274 The "at least as effective" test thus applies

267. Auchter, 763 F.2d at 735.
268. Auchter, 763 F.2d at 734 (quoting Louisiana Chem. Ass'n v. Bingham, 657 F.2d
777, 782 (5th Cir. 1981)).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 31852, 31860 (1987). The Sixth Circuit in Ohio Mfrs.
Ass'n v. City of Akron, 810 F.2d 824, 831-34 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied and appeal dis-

missed, 108 S.Ct. 44 (1987), deferred to the agency interpretation of the HCS, finding the

state statute regulating hazard communication preempted. The Sixth Circuit followed the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984), which
requires courts interpreting ambiguous federal regulatory statutes to defer to agency interpretations. See OSHA Preemption, supra note 12. The author argues that courts considering the
preemptive effect of the HCS upon state laws should perform their own preemption analysis,
rather than rely on agency interpretations, as courts are more experienced than agencies in
deciding preemption. But see Heineman & Phillips, FederalPreemption:A Comment on Regulator), Preemption After Hillsborough County, 18 URB. LAw 589, 604 (1986) (stating that
as long as an agency clearly states its grounds for preemption, its decision should be deferred
to for efficiency reasons).
273. 52 Fed. Reg. 31852, 31860 (1987).
274. 29 U.S.C.A. § 667(c)(2) (West 1985).
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only to state standards adopted under an approved state plan.275
The exclusive alternative to preemption is federal approval of
state plans.2 76 According to the New York State Department of
Health, Toxic Substance Division and the New York State Department of Labor, New York has not and does not intend to submit its
standard to OSHA.2
The revised HCS defines "an issue covered by a Federal standard" as any of the following: hazard communication, evaluation of
the potential hazards of chemicals, written hazard communication
programs (including lists of hazardous chemicals present), labeling
of containers of chemicals, preparation and distribution of MSDSs,
and development and implementation of employee training programs.2 17 The HCS is comprehensive.
D. Effect of HCS's Preemption Provisions on the New York Law
While the OSH Act expressly preempts state laws pertaining to
occupational safety or health, it does not preempt state laws with
other safety or health purposes not pertaining to workplaces.27 9 In
New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, s° the Third Circuit
found that the provisions of New Jersey's Right to Know statute
which pertained primarily to community or environmental safety and
health were not expressly preempted by the OSH Act.2 81 The New
Jersey law's purpose went beyond hazardous chemical communication in the workplace. That law perceived a "growing threat to the
public health" and established a "comprehensive program for the
disclosure of information about hazardous substances in the work275.
276.

Id.; Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. at 31860.
29 C.F.R. § 1926.59(a)(2) (1988); Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. at 31860.

277. Interviews with a research scientist at the New York State Department of Health,
Toxic Substance Division, and the Attorney General's office in New York City (February 20,
1990). The position taken by these state agencies, including the Department of Labor, is that
the New York Right to Know Law is preempted by the HCS as applied to the private sector
only. Only provisions dealing with recordkeeping requirements for employees exposed to Subpart Z substances, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12, § 820.5 (1989), and other public
health law provisions providing for public access are not preempted. New York has adopted a
federally-approved state plan for public sector workplaces.
If concluded that the HCS preempts a state Right to Know law until the state law is
approved by the Secretary of Labor, then, conversely, a grant of federal approval would shift
enforcement and the financial burden of enforcement from the federal government to the state.
Consequently, it is unlikely that states would affirmatively seek approval, as is the case in New
York. See Tyson, supra note 12, at 1018 & n.58 (1987).

278. 29 C.F.R. at § 1926.59(a)(2); see also Final Rule, 52 Fed.Reg. at 31861.
279. See OSHA Preemption, supra note 12.
280.

774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985).

281.

Id. at 593.
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In Hughey the appellate court remanded the case to the district
court to consider whether the universal labeling provision of the New
Jersey state law was preempted by the HCS.28 3 In February 1989,
the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision that the Act's
universal labeling requirement, section 14(b), was intended to provide information to police, firefighters, and the public, and was therefore not preempted by the HCS.2 s4
Similarly, in Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. City of
New York,285 the Second Circuit found that OSHA's Revised Construction Standard 288 only expressly preempted certain provisions of
New York City's regulation requiring a certification program for
employees who handle asbestos.2 8 7 Specifically, it preempted those
provisions which had only one purpose-protection of employees. 288
It did not preempt those provisions which had a broader purpose of
protecting the community at large. 8
Significantly, the Environmental court held that OSHA does
not expressly preempt state law where the law has "a legitimate and
substantial purpose apart from [protecting employees] .' 290 Thus,
under Environmental EncapsulatingCorp.,291 to avoid preemption it
is not necessary to demonstrate a primary purpose which differs
from the OSH Act's purpose; it is only necessary to demonstrate a
separate "legitimate and substantial" purpose. 92
Applying the same reasoning, the HCS does not preempt application of state criminal laws to protect employees from exposure to
hazardous substances. The court in Pymm made clear that the
282. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34.5A-2 (West 1984); cf.Manufacturer's Ass'n of Tri-County v.
Knepper, 801 F.2d 130, 137 (3d Cir. 1986) (concluding that HCS preempts state regulation

which has primary purpose of promoting occupational safety and health), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 66 (1987).
283. New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774 F.2d at 598.
284. New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey, 653 F. Supp. 1453, 1465
(D.N.J. 1987), aff'd, 868 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 109 S,Ct. 3246 (1989). Third
Circuit Judges Edward R. Becker, Leon A. Higginbotham, and Morton I. Greenberg vacated
a stay that had delayed implementation of the state labeling requirement since August 1986.
868 F.2d at 621.
285. 855 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1988).
286. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.59 (1988).
287. Environmental EncapsulatingCorp., 855 F.2d at 55.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 60.

290. Id. at 57.
291.
292.

Id.
Id.
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HCS's "orientation is prophylactic in nature, 29 3 and was not
designed to impose penalties after injuries occurred. 9 4 Thus, at least
in New York, state criminal laws may be used to enforce federal and
state health and safety laws against corporate employers.295
As to the New York law provisions, it appears that they are
concerned primarily with hazard communication in the workplace.
As the New York Public Health Law states: "[iut is the purpose of
this article to ensure that employees are given information by their
employers concerning the nature of toxic substances which they may
"298 "Workplace" is defined as "any
encounter in the workplace ..
location away from the home.

. .

where any employee performs any

work-related duty in the course of his employment. 297 However, the
New York Labor Law does contemplate benefits beyond worker
safety in its Declaration of'Purpose: "[lit is further found and declared that the workplace often provides an early warning mechanism for the rest of the environment."29 8 Thus, it is still not entirely
clear whether the law contains provisions that are severable as applying beyond the employment context and are not preempted by the
HCS.
The New York law's definition of toxic substances is more inclusive than the HCS's because it does not provide for any exemptions. For example, the HCS does not apply to hazardous waste.299
293. Pymm, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
294.
The express language of section 18(b) extends only to the development and enforce-

ment of state standards, not to enforcement of generally applicable state criminal
laws. . . . There is no indication that Congress intended the term 'standards' to
include general criminal laws or for section 18 to preempt or require federal ap-

proval of state enforcement of general criminal laws.
Getting Away with Murder, supra note 155, at 542 (footnote omitted) (1987); see also Hills-

borough County v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985); People v. Pymm, 151
A.D.2d 133, 546 N.Y.S.2d 871, 873 (App. Div. 1989). Federal statutes should not be inter-

preted so rigidly as to "prevent States from undertaking supplementary efforts toward [the]
very same end." New York State Dep't of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 419

(1973); accord Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978) (noting that it is
"particularly inappropriate" to infer preemption when the basic purposes of state and federal
laws are similar).
295. See also People v. Hegedus, 432 Mich. 598, 443 N.W.2d 127 (1989); accord People v. Chicago Magnet Wire, Corp., 126 Ill. 2d 356, 534 N.E.2d 962, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
52 (1989).
296. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4800 (McKinney 1985).
297. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 875(3) (MeKinney 1988); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4801(l)
(McKinney 1985).
298. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 875, Declaration of Purpose, L. 1980 § 1, ch. 551 (McKinney
1988).
299. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.59(b)(6) (1988).
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In addition, the New York law covers any substance listed in the
NIOSH registry, while the HCS only covers carcinogens listed by
NIOSH.300 The Commissioner of Health is empowered to make public any information concerning the toxic effects of substances found
in the course of employment.301 Thus, it can be argued that the New
York law encompasses a field (i.e. community health) that the HCS
does not.
Under Environmental EncapsulatingCorp.,302 the provisions of
the New York law that have a substantial purpose other than employee protection would probably not be expressly preempted. The
difficulty, however, would be in demonstrating that the community
purpose under the New York law is substantial,, and not merely incidental to the purpose of protecting employees.
With regard to the provisions of the New York law which are
arguably not expressly preempted, it is possible that they are impliedly preempted. To be impliedly preempted, the New York law
must either stand as an obstacle to the objectives of Congress or it
must be impossible to comply with the New York law and the
HCS.303 "IT]he fact that a state law provision increases the regulatory burden on employers does not make the state law provision contrary to congressional intent." 304 To preempt a section, it must be
clear that Congress would have intended to preempt such a provision.305 Concerning the promulgation of health and safety regulations, courts "should hesitate to invalidate such an exercise of traditional state police powers." 306 A presumption exists that unless
Congress so states, it does not intend to preempt state law. "Inference and implication will only rarely lead to the conclusion, that it
was the 'clear and manifest purpose' of the federal government '30to7
supersede the states' historic power to regulate health and safety.
In Environmental Encapsulating Corp., the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals found that those sections of the New York City
300. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 875(2) (McKinney 1988); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(d)(3), (4)
(1986); cf. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4801(2) (McKinney 1985).
301. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4802(2) (McKinney 1985).
302. See Environmental EncapsulatingCorp., 855 F.2d at 48.
303. See supra text and accompanying notes 243-45.
304. Hughey, 774 F.2d at 593.
305. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 634 (1981) (holding that
Montana's severance tax does not violate the Supremacy Clause because it is not inconsistent
with the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, as amended).
306. Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 666 F. Supp. 535, 543
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), af.fd in part, rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963)).
307. Environmental Encapsulating Corp., 855 F.2d at 58 (citation omitted).
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regulations that were not expressly preempted were also not impliedly preempted. 308 In this regard, the court held that OSHA's
comprehensiveness is not itself sufficient to justify preemption.3 09
Much more is required to overcome the presumption against implied
preemption.310
In determining whether OSHA preempts the New York law, a
court is likely to analyze each section separately as the Environmental court did.311 Thus, although it may theoretically be safe for employers to comply only with those provisions of the New York law
which are intended to protect the public at large, since this purpose
is difficult to discern, and since a court's action in this unsettled area
of law is unpredictable, it is.
safest for New York employers to continue to comply with the New York law in its entirety.
V.

CONCLUSION

The effective communication of hazards in the workplace to em'1 2
ployees is the goal of OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard.
It is also a primary goal of New York's Right to Know legislation. ' 3
After years of complex litigation over the breadth of coverage of the
HCS, and with the increasing interest of prosecutors, at the state
and federal levels, in compelling corporate compliance with laws regulating hazardous substances in the environment, a new era may finally be dawning where compliance with the federal and state hazard communication laws replaces ignorance or disregard of the laws
and combative litigation over issues of coverage and preemption.
With the Supreme Court's recent decision in Dole v. United
Steelworkers of America 14 putting to rest some of the technical objections to broad enforcement of the HCS, it is likely that there will
soon be developing a "common law of industry" where compliance
with the HCS, plus compliance with applicable state statutes, becomes the norm rather than the exception throughout the nation.

308. Id.
309. See id.
310. Id. at 58.
311. Id. at 48.
312. Final Rule 52 Fed. Reg. 31852 (1987).
313. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 875 (McKinney 1988); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4800 (McKinney 1985).
314. Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., I10 S. Ct. 929 (1990); see supra note 52
(discussing the case in more detail).
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